A honeynet is a portion of routed but otherwise unused address space that is instrumented for network traffic monitoring. It is an invaluable tool for understanding unwanted Internet traffic and malicious attacks. We formalize the problem of defending honeynets from systematic mapping (a serious threat to their viability) as a simple two-person game. The objective of the Attacker is to identify a honeynet with a minimum number of probes. The objective of the Defender is to maintain a honeynet for as long as possible before moving it to a new location within a larger address space. Using this game theoretic framework, we describe and prove optimal or near-optimal strategies for both Attacker and Defender. This is the first mathematically rigorous study of this increasingly important problem on honeynet defense. Our theoretical ideas provide the first formalism of the honeynet monitoring problem, illustrate the viability of network address shuffling, and inform the design of next generation honeynet defense.
honeynet systems is active and focused on enabling scalable and secure measurement at greater levels of detail.
The successes and utility of honeynets are not likely to be lost on the Black Hats. Several recent studies have shown that well-known monitoring entities such as Dshield.org [10] can be identified effectively by using different probing methods [1, 8, 7] . Black Hats can adopt these techniques to create blacklists of address space for honeynets, which would effectively render them useless.
In this paper, we address the problem of how to thwart attempts to map honeynets. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to address this problem formally (it is mentioned briefly in [11] ). We model the situation as a two-player game between an Attacker and a Defender. The objective of the Attacker is to identify the segment of monitored addresses (i.e., the honeynet) within a larger address space. The Attacker does this by sending probes to the address space. The responses typically reveal distinguishing characteristics of the type of addresses being probed, i.e., corresponding with either a live system or an address within the honeynet. An important capability in some honeynets is that they can respond to probes in a protocol compliant way (e.g., [13] ). When a probe is received on a honeynet address, the Defender can obfuscate its response by mimicking what would have been sent by a live system on a regular IP address. However, this obfuscation takes resources, and for a given resource bound, the Attacker will eventually be able to distinguish those responses coming from a honeynet.
The objective of a honeynet is to collect data as long as possible without being mapped by an Attacker. However, once identified, a honeynet will have to be assigned to a new set of addresses. This remapping or shuffling is a costly process. An additional objective of the Attacker is to identify the honeynet with a minimum number of probes. The Defender has two objectives. The first is to prevent the honeynet from being identified, which is done by periodically shuffling its location within the address space. The second objective is to extend the duration of shuffling epochs in order to minimize demands on the system responsible for shuffling. The Defender can use its protocol mimicking capability as a means for delaying the reshuffling. The game itself will focus on what transpires between shuffling epochs. Mathematically, we model the response by the Defender for any probe as either 0 or 1. If the probe is sent to an IP address that is not part of the honeynet, then the response is 0. If the probe is sent to an IP address that is part of the honeynet, then the Defender may either respond truthfully with 1, or obfuscate with a "lie" 0. We assume that the Attacker cannot distinguish between a lie and the response from a live host. We model resource limitations as a global lie budget for the Defender. Within this context, we are able to prove optimal or near-optimal strategies for both the Attacker and Defender.
In Section 2.1, we first formally define the game. Then we develop general bounds, and the analysis leads to two particular strategies. The main theorem is Theorem 2, which establishes a unique optimality result. The proof is based on a key combinatorial lemma (Lemma 1) about certain optimal packing strategies. This lemma is easy to understand and quite plausible intuitively, but, its proof is more difficult. We then extend our basic formulation of the game to consider the situation of having multiple segments of honeynets within the address space. Here we introduce a strategy with an amortized complexity analysis that is optimal up to a constant factor.
Our basic game theoretic formulation plus the extensions enable us to analyze the processes of attacking and defending honeynets experimentally. We conducted a series of evaluations over a range of possible configurations to assess the trade-offs between address space size, honeynet size, probe rates, and shuffling frequency. In [12] , we discuss practical considerations involved in network address shuffling and evaluate our implementation of a network address shuffling middlebox called Kaleidoscope. Due to space limitations, some details and proofs are omitted (see our techreport [2] ).
The Attacker-Defender Game

Basic Formulation
We model the adversary/honeynet interaction within a reshuffling epoch as a 2-person game between an Attacker and a Defender. A contiguous segment of monitored addresses is placed randomly within an address space. We call monitored addresses (i.e., the honeynet) "black" and all other addresses "white". During the game the Attacker queries addresses and receives a reply based on the color of the address queried. White addresses must reply "white" (represented by a bit 0) but black addresses may answer black (represented by a bit 1) or "lie" and answer "white" (a bit 0). We impose a global limit on the number of lies allowed but they can be used flexibly. This global limit is imposed to reflect the cost on total system memory and other resources (within a reshuffling epoch). (See technical report for more discussions on the model and its variations.) Formally, let m, k and be positive integers. Let n = mk. Our address space is a circular array of n cells, identified with the additive group Z n , i.e., each cell is indexed by some i ∈ Z n . We use the following notation: The game starts with a random spin of B c , that is, a uniformly distributed c ∈ Z n . We assume that both players know the parameters m, k, and . The position c is known to the Defender D but unknown to the Attacker A whose aim is to find it. In a round of the game (i.e., between shuffling epochs), A moves first and the two players alternate their moves until A knows c. A move of A consists of a query at a cell j. If j ∈ B c then D replies with the bit b = 0. If j ∈ B c then D has a choice: D can either answer b = 1 or, commit a lie by answering b = 0. However, D can only lie < times in total. In short, n is the size of the circular address space, m is the length of a monitor block, k = n/m, and is the quota of lies. (Note that = 1 is the smallest possible and represents no lies allowed. We also note that the lie quota should only be considered a fixed parameter for the duration between resuffling epochs. The assumption that an attacker knows the block size is in keeping with the tradition in security where we want to err on the side of giving attackers extra information. This information of block size is hard to keep as a secret at any rate, and one can reasonably expect that an estimate by attackers can be obtained with some probes.)
Denote by A (respectively D) a strategy by the Attacker (respectively the Defender). We will primarily analyze pure (nonrandomized) strategies; but with a slight abuse of notation we will use the same notation for randomized strategies. Let V = V (A, D) denote the number of queries A makes against D until A learns the value c. Thus, V is a variable randomized over the uniform choices of c ∈ Z n (and possibly over the randomization of the randomized strategies of the two players). Let v denote the expectation
The objective of the Attacker is to minimize this quantity v. The objective of the Defender is to maximize v.
The Strategies: Round-Robin (RR) and Delay-Delay (DD)
Before giving a more detailed analysis of this game, we make some general observa- . Now we can consider the problem of placing the shortened block on the condition that it contains a certain cell (the identified j and j + ). This describes a "binary search" process.
It is clear that every step of this "binary search" reduces the length from m to m /2 . When the length has shrunk to 1, the game is over. If 2 r−1 < m ≤ 2 r , then it takes exactly r = log 2 m steps to reduce the length to 1. If A queries j − and j + in random order, then on average each step takes 1.5 queries. Let be the number of lies D is still allowed to commit ( < and may be much less because of lies committed prior to the "binary search"). Then we have an upper bound of 2 + 1.5 log 2 m queries under this Attacker strategy, valid for any D.
We see that once the Attacker gains the knowledge of one j ∈ B c , A can zero-in fairly rapidly. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a rational Defender will not reveal any j ∈ B c until being forced to (this statement will be qualified, see below). This reasoning leads us to the following Delay-Delay (DD) strategy for the Defender. Note that with at most k queries, RR will obtain a b = 1 answer, and commence its "binary search". Indeed, when RR has made k queries, these would have been for
Delay-Delay against Any Attacker
We provide a simple lower bound for v(A, DD). These considerations justify our adoption of DD for the Defender in the following. (Curiously, if the Defender knew that the Attacker is RR, then he actually should do the opposite of DD, and save his entire quota of lies for the "binary search" stage, saving a constant factor.) We note that (1) DD performs well against any A, and (2) for one particular A, namely A = RR, DD performs almost as well as any D (Section 2.2).
Definition 4. For an Attacker A and Defender D, the Capitulation-Time, L = L(A, D), is the first time (the number of queries made) when A has made queries in B c against D.
For an arbitrary pair (A, D) it is possible that the game ends (when A learns c) before A ever hits times in B c . In this case we define L = ∞.
We can prove the following
Note that our bound on E[L(A, DD)] is within a factor 2 of the case when the Attacker uses RR against any Defender strategy D. Once the Attacker is at CapitulationTime, all that remains is to pinpoint c. Doing so takes Ω(log m) time. Thus we arrive at the following corollary.
Corollary 1. v(A, DD) > kl/4 + Ω(log m).
Round-Robin is optimal against Delay-Delay
In this section we establish our main result that RR is optimal against DD. In fact, we will prove a stronger theorem of unique optimality (Theorem 2).
Definition 5. An Attacker strategy A is essentially Round-Robin (eRR) if it is of the following form.
The strategy A first makes queries at some cell j. It then updates j to j where j ≡ j (mod m) and j has not been queried and makes queries at j . The strategy repeats this behavior until it finds some j ∈ B c , i.e., receives b = 1, at which point it switches to a "binary-search". 
Clearly, E[L(eRR, DD)] = E[L(RR, DD)]. (1)
Theorem 2. For any Attacker A that is not eRR,
Let C(S ) = |{c ∈ Z n | c is heavy}| denote the number of heavy points w.r.t. S. A weaker bound C(S ) ≤ m · p follows easily from a volume argument. But we need the stronger version to prove Theorem 2. The proof of the lemma is presented in the extended technical report version. Here we prove the Theorem assuming the Lemma.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 2). Clearly Pr[L(RR, DD)
= ∞] = 0. If Pr[L(A, DD) = ∞] = 0, then (2) is obvious. Suppose Pr[L(A, DD) = ∞] = 0. We are concerned with E[L] = ∞ ∑ i=1 Pr[L ≥ i] = 1 + ∞ ∑ i=1 Pr[L > i],(3)
for L = L(A, DD) and L(RR, DD). Our goal is to show that RR minimizes E[L]. Let E A [L] = E[L(A, DD)] denote the expectation of the Capitulation-Time for Attacker
A against Defender DD. Similarly, Pr A indicates the probability for Attacker A against Defender DD. Our first goal is to prove the (nonstrict) dominance of RR:
We establish 
Imagine that we are given the first i (not necessarily distinct) query points. Each query point j defines a block B j . We observe that j hits B d iff d belongs to the block B j . Let S i be the configuration consisting of i blocks corresponding to the queries the Attacker would make assuming the Defender answers b = 0 to the first i − 1 queries.
The equality is clear if all first i answers are indeed b = 0. We prove the equality is valid for the actual interaction that defines H i . We prove this by induction. For i = 1 the result holds. Assume the result holds up to < i. The probability Pr A [H i ≥ ] is 1/n times the number of d such that B d was hit at least times during the first i queries. 
To prove the strict dominance of RR (and eRR) over any other A against DD, we reason as follows. If the first queries are not at the same cell, then at the -th query, RR produces exactly m heavy points while A has strictly less. Thus, at the -th term in the sum for E A [L], the inequality Pr A [H ≥ ] < Pr RR [H ≥ ] is strict. As we have the (nonstrict) dominance of RR for every term we arrive at
We now assume that the first queries are at a single cell. Let j 1 be that location. If the next queries are not at some cell j 2 then consider the time step 2 . By the same argument, at 2 we have a strict inequality and a (nonstrict) dominance of RR elsewhere, that again gives
. This argument proves that to be optimal, the locations of the queries j 1 , j 2 , . . . must be repeated times each in succession.
Finally, consider the possibility of two query locations j and j with j ≡ j (mod m). Then at time step i = k , RR produces a perfect cover of all Z n with multiplicity . Meanwhile, A has an imperfect cover of all Z n that produces a strict inequality in favor of RR. So again, we find that
This proves the strict optimality of RR (and eRR).
Extension to Multiple Monitoring Blocks
We briefly discuss the situation when multiple monitoring blocks are present in the address space. We assume for simplicity that the monitor blocks are pairwise disjoint and each has length m. Assume there are b monitor blocks, b < k, and n = km is the total size of the circular address space identified with Z n as before. The Attacker can still start with a Round Robin. Randomly pick a cell j 0 ∈ Z n to start. If the current query cell is j, then query it until receiving an answer b = 1, or have queried it times. Then replace j by j + m. We repeat this until j = j 0 again. At this point, we will have queried k = n/m locations. At each such location j we record the final bit b j . Notice that these bits are all correct answers. We will show that, in the presence of multiple monitoring blocks, this Round Robin strategy followed by a certain 'one-sided binary search' (we denote it by OSBS) can achieve essentially as good an upper bound as when there is only one block of length m, regardless of Defender's strategy. This justifies our consideration of only this Round Robin strategy for A. At the same time, a suitable Defender's strategy can achieve essentially the same quantity as a lower bound for the Defender, and therefore we have characterized the game.
Consider those bits b j = 1. These indicate the presence of the monitoring blocks. We observe that no two bits can refer to the same block and each block must make its presence known through one of these bits. The bits b j = 1 partition the k queried locations into contiguous runs of 1's separated by 0's in a circular array of k bits. We will concentrate on one such run of 1's. There is no interference between different runs OSBS algorithm: In view of this, we carry out our OSBS as follows. We select our next new query point just as in ordinary binary search, as if there were no lies. Record the answer bits as β 1 β 2 . . ., where for each β i = 0 or 1 we branch left or right, respectively. If any β i = 0 at a cell x, however, we modify ordinary binary search as follows. We will come back to do a 'repeated querying' at this location x, one query per each step, as we descend in the binary search to its left, until either:
-(a) we reach bottom (finding a presumptive c). If so, confirm β i = 0 by querying times, else go to (b). -(b) we discover β i = 0 at x was a lie. If so, abandon work to the left of x, resume at x branching to the right. -(c) have made queries at x, confirming β i = 0 is true. If so, resume OSBS with no more queries at x. -(d) got a new bit β j = 0 at a cell y, further down in the binary search (i.e., j > i). If so, replace y with x and proceed recursively.
Note that in case (b), it is possible that, due to recursion, there is a 'higher' x in the binary search tree where the corresponding bit β i = 0, and the 'repeated querying' at x was suspended because of x by case (d) for x . At this point we resume the 'repeated querying' at x . The search ends by finding c and the confirmation that the smallest cell to its right for which the bit β i = 0 is not a lie (by having made a total of queries there). If all β i = 1, then we must end in c = m − 1. This must be correct and there were no lies committed. In Figure 1 , we illustrate OSBS traversal with an example.
We claim that we make at most O( + log m) queries in total. It is clear that this bound holds if no lies are committed. The O(log m) pays for the 'binary search' and O( ) pays for the final confirmation. Suppose at some step during OSBS a lie was committed at x. We observe the following: in the descent in the binary search to the left of x, all subsequent answers with a β = 0 are lies. In this case, every step of the 'repeated querying' at x, as well as recursively all 'repeated querying' at locations to the left of x with a β = 0 in OSBS is charged to a total quota of < lies. Each of up to lies pays for O(1) queries. This pays for the ordinary binary search queries at new locations descending from x as well. We also note that in case (c) above, a confirmation at x for a β i = 0 also confirms all 'higher' x in the binary search tree where the bit
In short, OSBS makes O( + log m) queries in total. Corresponding to an ordinary binary search, it does the 'repeated querying', which costs at most two queries per each ordinary binary search step. In addition, when OSBS discovers a lie at x, it abandons the portion of the work done after x. But that amount of work is proportional to the number of queries made at a location with a lie, and therefore costs O( ). Every lie β = 0 is eventually discovered. The total amount of work consists of (1) at most double the work in ordinary binary search, and (2) the abandoned work (due to the discovery of lies) which is at most O( ). 
Summary and Conclusion
In the perennial struggle against network intruders and malicious attacks, safeguarding honeynet monitors is becoming an urgent problem. This paper abstracts the problem in a game theoretic framework, and analyzes optimal strategies for both the Attacker and Defender. To achieve provable results and mathematical elegance, it is necessary to abstract away many systems details. But these abstractions aim to capture the most salient features of the network reality, and to achieve a reasonable balance of system relevance and theoretical tractability. As far as we know, our paper is the first to provide a theoretical foundation for honeynet defense. It has also proven useful in guiding the development of Kaleidoscope, an experimental middlebox for safeguarding honeynet monitors. Our experience with Kaleidoscope also reveals a number of system issues and variants that can be further analyzed in a game theoretic setting.
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